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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of the paper is to describe the main characteristics of the Hungarian public 
administration reform that has been implemented since 2010, as well as to highlight the 
inconsistent nature of some of its elements, and to discuss the connected risks. The starting point 
of the study is the Magyary Zoltán Public Administration Development Programme, containing 
the reforms and principles of the public administration system to be introduced by the 
conservative government formed in 2010. In order to highlight the main characteristics of the 
Magyary Programme the methodology of comparison was applied; the recommendations of the 
Magyary Programme are compared with the principle and guidance of the ideal type new public 
management (NPM) approach. 
 Based on the academic literature, the first section offers a brief overview of the ideal type 
NPM approach. The following section covers the relationship between NPM and the Magyary 
Programme: we shall focus on the four areas of intervention of the programme and examine 
whether or not specific points of the programme are compatible with NPM. Every area of 
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intervention is analyzed separately, but special attention is paid to the restructuring of public 
administration, since this area of intervention of the Magyary Programme has already been 
implemented and resulted in a significant change in the Hungarian public administration system. 
 To show the relevance of our research, a brief detour on the impact of the 2007/8 economic 
crisis on the NPM movement seems in order because the very relevance of NPM was seriously 
challenged in its wake (Arellano-Gault 2010; Bao – Wang – Larsen – Morgan 2013; Lapsley 
2009; Peters – Pierre – Randma-Liv 2011; Siltala 2013). In our view, the setback suffered by the 
NPM philosophy is ephemeral because the transaction costs of government intervention and 
bureaucratic management will likely exceed the level that governments will be able to finance 
already in the short run. Various NPM proposals calling for market mechanisms in public 
administration that already determine the NPM practice in Anglo-Saxon countries will again gain 
prominence in democracies with a capitalist system after the crisis is over. If applied in a manner 
that is congruent with the social and natural environment, as well as with institutional and 
cultural milieu, the NPM-inspired management tools will be able to stop the pendulum that now 
swings towards bureaucratic coordination and revert it to economic rationality and market 
mechanism. This will call for a re-assessment of the government’s role, which will again clear 
the path for a conservative/liberal economic policy that has strong ties with the NPM movement 
and stands in stark contrast with the economic policies currently pursued in several countries. 
Hopefully, the backlash will not be too great and economic actors will learn from the mistakes of 
the past: a well-functioning, efficient government capable of handling market failures, the 
freedom of private property and the unique efficiency and innovativeness of market mechanisms 
are all necessary for a sustainable development.
1
 
 If the above scenario is correct, the NPM philosophy will continue to play a decisive role in 
the economic policy of developed countries, and it is therefore relevant to examine how the NPM 
philosophy is reflected in the Magyary Programme, the strategic public administration 
development plan of the current conservative Hungarian government.
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1
  According to Lapsley (2010: 19), “NPM is not dead. The current global financial collapse intensifies the 
importance of NPM to reforming governments. This financial crisis underlines the significance of NPM for the 
next decade, at least”. See also Haynes (2011). 
2
  The article does not intend to deliver an opinion on the NPM approach; it is merely used as a tool for 
comparison, based on which the internal contradictions of the Hungarian public administration reform can be 
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 The relevance of the article is strengthened by the fact that only a few scientific articles have 
analyzed the so-called “unorthodox” reform steps of the conservative Hungarian government, in 
the course of which the Hungarian government intends to take an unconventional path in public 
administration restructuring, as well as in economic and social policy. (Lengyel – Ilonszki, 
2012). The government – not completely unrealistically - is confident that other countries, 
primarily Central-Eastern European countries, will follow this path. The Hungarian public 
administration reform can be characterized by strong centralization
3
, the strengthening of the 
state’s role and the revitalization of the Hungarian anti-liberal, etatist traditions at macro level, 
and – especially for communication purposes – by the support of the enhancement of market 
rules and management at micro level. 
 
2. New Public Management, definition, instruments and their categorization 
 
This section is devoted to the creation of an acceptable interpretative framework. First, we shall 
define the NPM movement. The concept of NPM has been repeatedly addressed by the scientific 
community, but none of the proposed definitions have become generally accepted. (Bornis 2002; 
OECD 1995; Van de Walle – Hammerschmid 2011) 
 In the present study, NPM is defined as the public management movement, which set out to 
radically improve of the public sector efficiency and determined the public administration 
reforms in the Anglo-Saxon countries from the early 1980s and in the Western and Northern 
European countries from the early 1990s (Kuhlmann 2010). NPM is theoretically well grounded 
in management sciences and new institutional economics, specifically in public choice theory, 
transaction cost economics and principal-agent theory (Barzelay 2001; Borins 2002; Boston 
                                                                                                                                                             
discussed. The ideal type NPM approach is suitable for this, because its basic principles are clear and 
unambiguous for public management experts – in spite of the debates on NPM. The information provided in 
the article is also relevant for those who oppose the NPM approach and for those who believe that this 
approach will fade away. However, based on the above it is obvious that the author expects NPM to gain in 
importance in the future. 
3
  By centralization, we mean a change that affects the decision-making, control and instruction competencies, 
partially or wholly transferring them to an upper level of the administrative hierarchy (Hutchcroft 2001; Pollitt 
– Bouckaert 2011:104). 
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2011; Grüning 2001). The improvement of the efficiency of the public sector is envisioned 
through the use of stronger market mechanisms (e.g. privatization, outsourcing, PPP, contracting 
out) (Greve – Hodge 2011; Pallesen 2011; Walker – Brewer – Boyne – Avellaneda 2011), 
decentralization and structural reorganisation (e.g. through the decentralization of the execution 
of tasks via semi-autonomous organizations, separation of provision and production and 
separation of politics and administration as well) (Box – Marshall – Reed – Reed 2001; Manning 
2001; Moynihan 2006; Pollitt 2005), the introduction of accounting and management innovations 
(e.g., performance assessment, accrual accounting) (Hood 2007; Pollitt 2002) and the application 
of other management techniques used in the private sector (Bach – Bordogna 2011; Van der 
Walle – Hammerschmied 2011). From the 1990s onward, there has been a growing emphasis on 
citizens’ needs and demands: the involvement of citizens in community decisions (i.e. customer 
orientation and the support of an active citizenry) became one of the movement’s priorities.4 
 After defining the NPM, we shall briefly review the diverse instruments employed by NPM, 
based on two key studies. Hood’s (1991) seminal study is one of the key texts in NPM studies. 
Most instruments lumped together under NPM are generally categorized according to his 
doctrines. 
 Table 1 shows that all NPM instruments can be assigned to one or another of Hood’s seven 
doctrines of NPM and, also, that these components are rational, consistent and form a coherent 
whole. 
 
Table 1. Hood’s doctrines and the NPM instruments 
No. Doctrine Instrument 
1 
‘Hands-on professional management’ in the 
public sector 
HRM systems, strategic planning, 
transformation of formal institutions 
(e.g., regulation of the hiring and 
                                                 
4
  As one can see, the NPM is a very diverse trend that can also be considered as an approach. In this article the 
Hungarian reforms are not compared with the NPM practice of a particular country but with the ideal type 
NPM approach. About NPM in general see also: Christensen – Laegreid (2002); Christensen – Lægreid (2011); 
McLaughlin – Osborne – Ferlie (2002); Ongaro (2009); Osborne – Gaebler (1992); Pollitt – Bouckaert (2011), 
Pollitt – van Thiel – Homburg (2007) and Zavattaro (2013). 
 5 
 
dismissal of employees) 
2 
Explicit standards and measures of 
performance 
Balanced indicator system 
3 Greater emphasis on output controls 
Performance assessment systems, 
performance-based pay 
4 
Shift to disaggregation of units in the public 
sector 
Organizational restructuring: creation 
of single-purpose organizations, 
agencies, holdings, structural 
reorganization within an organization 
5 
Shift to greater competition in the public 
sector 
Outsourcing, contracting out, PPP, 
service level contracts 
6 
Stress on private-sector styles of 
management practice 
Budget reforms, adoption of 
accounting policies, greater 
integration of IT, change management 
7 
Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in 
resource use 
Accounting regulations, employment 
of internal and external audit systems 
Source: Hood (1991:4-5); Instrument column added by the author 
 
 Beside the categories set up by Hood (1991), the categories proposed by Schedler – Proeller 
(2002) which are based on their study of the NPM practices by the local governments of 
Continental European countries are also reviewed in order to better understand the NPM 
instruments. 
 
Table 2. Generic element categories of NPM 
Category Characteristics/objectives Examples 
Organisational restructuring Decentralization 
Delegation of responsibility 
Reduction of hierarchy 
Separation of political and 
managerial roles 
City managers 
Holding structure 
Agencies 
Management instruments Output orientation Performance agreements 
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Entrepreneurship in public 
administration 
Efficiency 
Performance-related pay 
Budgetary reforms Closer to private sector 
financial instruments 
Cost accounting 
Balance sheet 
Accrual accounting 
Participation Involvement of the citizen Neighbourhood councils 
E-democracy 
Co-operation with civil 
organizations 
Customer orientation 
Quality management 
Gain legitimacy in service 
delivery by improving 
quality 
Re-engineering 
One-stop shops 
Service level agreements 
E-government 
Marketisation 
Privatisation 
Reduction of public sector 
Efficiency gains through 
competition and market 
coordination 
Privatisation 
Contracting out 
PPP 
Public procurement 
Source: Schedler – Proeller (2002:165), with the author’s supplements 
 
 Table 2 shows the wide range of reform proposals made by NPM for improving the 
administrative system. The beauty of NPM lies exactly in its clear and multi-facetted theoretical 
grounding and its wide range of practical instruments. We may quote the metaphor by (Pollitt 
1995:133) that NPM is basically a shopping basket in which the governments and experts of a 
particular country can simply select the reform proposals and managerial instruments that are 
best compatible with their country’s culture. However, a shopping of this kind is not as simple as 
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it might appear at first glance: the selected items have to fit the country’s institutions and its 
administrative culture, as well as with each other.
5
 
 The above brief overview shows that there is a broad consensus among scholars discussing 
NPM instruments that NPM strives to improve the efficiency of the public sphere by reducing 
bureaucratic coordination and state property, by the structural transformation of the public sector 
organizations, by financial and budgetary reforms, and by focusing more on human resource 
management and other management reforms influencing bureaucratic behavior, as well as by 
reforms designed to promote a greater focus on citizen needs and citizen participation. The 
careful reader has probably realized that the reforms advocated by the NPM movement include 
both systemic and organizational recommendations, and that the consistent application of these 
measures poses a real challenge to practitioners. 
 
3. The relationship between the New Public Management and the Magyary Development 
Programme 
 
The Magyary Programme contains both systemic (macro-level) and organizational (micro-level) 
reform proposals. While the systemic reform proposals are generally characterized by a rejection 
of the NPM philosophy and its instruments, the ideological impact of NPM can be demonstrated 
on the organizational level. The linkage between the Magyary Programme and the Neo-
Weberian state concept is best illustrated by the fact that systemic reform proposals are partially 
based on Weberian elements, while organization level reforms take the neo elements derived 
from the NPM movement as their starting point.
6
 In addition to specifically mentioning the Neo-
Weberian concept of the state (Pollitt – Bouckaert 2011), the Magyary Programme lists the key 
areas that were targeted by the public administration reform proposals made by the EU member 
states: “enhancement of the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration; downsizing the 
costs of public administration; increasing the performance of public administration; involvement 
                                                 
5
  For other categorizations of the NPM instruments, see Alonso – Clifton – Díaz-Fuentes (2011); Christensen – 
Lægreid (2002); Grüning (2001); Manning – Shepherd – Blum – Laudares (2008); Pollitt – Summa (1997) and 
Torres (2004). 
6
  Hajnal – Rosta (2014) rejects that the Hungarian public administration reforms – at local level – follows the 
Neo-Weberian state concept. 
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of citizens; broadening transparency; modernization and integration of IT technologies into 
administrative work; citizen-friendly administration; citizens’ charters” (MPAJ 2011:16). These 
proposals are all coherent with the NPM philosophy and can be associated with one or another of 
Hood’s (1991) doctrines. 
 The systemic reform proposals made in the Magyary Programme – of which a stronger 
centralisation has already been implemented in the case of background institutions,
7
 as shown by 
Table 3 – are in line with international trends in terms of the international administrative re-
organisations in the wake of the economic crisis (Jun 2009). One consequence of the economic 
crisis was the spread of centralisation even in countries with a good NPM record. 
 
Table 3. Changes in the organizational structure of public administration 
Organization type Number in 
2010 
Number in 
2011 
Ministries 13 8 
Organs with national-wide competencies 45 47 
Deconcentrated / territorial state administration organs 292 93 
Public service providers 193 92 
Foundations and public foundations created by the 
government and the ministries 
68 21 
Public companies 38 57 
Total 649 318 
Source: MPAJ (2011: 24) 
 
In addition to being coherent with international trends, it must also be noted that the “anti-NPM 
type” measures (Hajnal 2011: 67) introduced during the restructuring of the Hungarian public 
                                                 
7
  Foundations and public foundations are one case in point. Version 12.0 of the Magyary Programme reveals 
that 28 of the 60 public foundations were terminated without a legal successor, while 12 were merged with 
business associations. Only 20 public foundations were retained, all with a changed staff (MPAJ 2012:22). 
These steps are in line with Kornai’s (2012: 576) statement that after 2010 there is a “merger mania” in 
Hungary. 
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administration system were not and are not driven by any political ideology. Hajnal (2011) has 
demonstrated that the socialist second Gyurcsány government, coming into office in 2006, 
merged several agencies with a larger autonomy as well. An overview of the Magyary 
Programme and the already implemented structural changes in public administration clearly 
show that the conservative second Orbán government has merely accelerated and broadened this 
process.
8
 The level of centralization implemented by the Hungarian government is significantly 
higher than the correction measures introduced in Western-Europe as a response to the crisis to 
balance off the impacts of the far reaching decentralization of NPM. The centralization steps of 
the Hungarian public administration reforms had an impact on all levels and almost all 
organizational units of public administration. Kornai (2012, pp. 50-51) describes the approach of 
the Orbán government as follows: “Wherever a problem is perceived, the panacea is to centralize 
and amalgamate. […] All the changes listed point in a clearly perceptible direction: they 
reinforce centralization. I term this strong, radical, clearly observable and dizzyingly rapid 
process of transformation as a centralizing tendency.” 
 
 Table 4 presents the recommended measurers within the intervention area of the Magyary 
Programme focusing on organizational structures, their relationship with the NPM approach as 
well as their expected political objectives and impacts. 
 
Table 4. Relationship between the proposals and recommended measures for organizational 
restructuring in the Magyary Programme and the NPM 
                                                 
8
  To date, the systemic restructuring outlined in the Magyary Programme has already been implemented, while 
the introduction of organization level changes is slower. One possible explanation is that systemic reforms can 
be principally blocked on the political level: however, the government’s two-thirds majority in Parliament and 
the power relations in the political arena have ensured that the government does not face and does not have to 
deal with political resistance. In contrast, the implementation of organizational level reforms, including the 
application of NPM instruments, is not simply a question of political will, but calls for the active contribution 
of public servants to ensure its success. This might pose a serious obstacle because the cultural values 
promoted by NPM and the cultural attitudes characterizing Hungarian society are far less compatible than in 
the UK, New Zealand and the US. For the institutional determinateness of NPM, see Schedler and Proeller 
(2007). 
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Reform proposals compatible with the 
NPM philosophy 
Reform proposals incompatible with the NPM philosophy 
Creation of the National Development 
Government Committee – separation of 
decision-making and execution 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s 
(2002) organizational restructuring 
category and Hood’s (1991) first doctrine 
Creation of the National Development Government 
Committee – strong centralization of competencies under the 
Prime Minister’s Office 
 
Incompatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) 
organizational restructuring category and Hood’s (1991) 
fourth doctrine 
Delegation of competencies and tasks from 
the county level to the district level during 
the creation of administrative districts – 
the executive level is closer to citizens 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s 
(2002) organizational restructuring 
category and Hood’s (1991) fourth 
doctrine 
Centralization of tasks from the local government level to 
the district level 
 
Incompatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) 
organizational restructuring category and Hood’s (1991) 
fourth doctrine 
Greater integration of IT as part of the 
Ereky Programme 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s 
(2002) management instruments category 
and Hood’s (1991) fifth doctrine 
Introduction of so-called summit ministries 
 
Incompatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) 
organizational restructuring category and Hood’s (1991) 
forth doctrine 
 Centralization towards the central public administration 
(state administration) from all other levels of the public 
administration (regional, county, micro-regional, local 
governments.) Examples:  
Transferring of regional development agencies into state 
ownership  
Integration of professional municipal fire brigades into the 
organization of the National Directorate General for Disaster 
Management 
 
Incompatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) 
organizational restructuring category and Hood’s (1991) 
fourth doctrine 
 Proposals for simplification and standardization on the 
middle management level through the creation of a single 
sectoral office responsible for middle management in each 
sector after the system’s consolidation is completed (MPAJ 
2012:20) 
 
Incompatible with Schedler – Proeller’s (2002) 
organizational restructuring category and Hood’s (1991) 
fourth doctrine 
 Termination or merging of organizations in the case of the 
background institutions of the central administration 
 
Examples:  
1. Merging of the Judicial Service of the Ministry of Public 
Administration and Justice, the Asset Management Centre of 
the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, the 
Wekerle Sándor Asset Manager, The National Institute for 
Public Administration and the ECOSTAT Governmental 
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Impact Assessment Centre into a new Office of Public 
Administration and Justice 
2. Creation of the National Institute for Quality and 
Organizational Development in Healthcare and Medicines 
3. Creation of County Institution Operator Centers 
4. Regional development councils, county regional 
development councils and micro-territorial development 
councils were abolished 
5. Complete reorganization and centralization of public 
foundations 
 
Incompatible with Schedler – Proeller’s (2002) 
organizational restructuring category and Hood’s (1991) 
fourth doctrine 
 Remarks criticizing privatization and contracting out in the 
Magyary Programme: “Claiming to reduce the state debt, the 
state performed a series of privatizations in the recent past 
based on a wholly mistaken and false concept of the state, as 
a result of which the state’s leverage and influence were 
disproportionately and adversely reduced in certain sectors, 
while the transactions involved costs of objectionable scale.” 
(MPAJ 2011:11) 
 
Incompatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) 
marketization / privatization category and Hood’s (1991) 
fifth doctrine 
Source: MPAJ (2011) and MPAJ (2012) 
 
 Table 4 indicates that most of the systemic reform proposals set down in the Magyary 
Programme run counter to the values promoted by the NPM movement. The Magyary 
Programme seeks for a strongly centralized public administration system. The perhaps most 
salient difference between the NPM philosophy and the approach of the Magyary Programme is 
that NPM advocates confidence in the civil servants’ professional expertise and competence and 
believes that politicians are capable of adequately monitoring a decentralized public 
administration and hence bureaucrats’ activities are in favor of the needs and interests of the 
citizens. The essence of the NPM philosophy is the separation of politicians responsible for 
political decisions, who have the final word on what to do, and of public servants responsible for 
execution, who can decide on how to achieve the set goals. The systemic reforms outlined in the 
Magyary Programme would suggest that its authors believe that a public administration with 
stronger ties to the central government has a greater professional competence and/or stronger 
loyalties to politicians than public servants working in decentralized organizations (agencies, 
local governments). They apparently believe that political decision-makers have greater control 
over a centralized public administration than over a decentralized one. While the ultimate goal of 
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centralization is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative system, it is 
questionable whether the efficiency benefits from centralization exceed the costs of eliminating 
decentralization. It also remains to be seen whether there will be a synergy or conflict between 
the systemic and organizational reforms proposed in the programme.
9
 
 Based on Table 4 not only the relationship between the NPM approach and reform measures 
connected to the organizational restructuring can be reviewed, but also the objectives and 
impacts of these steps. As shown in Table 4, the objective of most of the structural reform 
recommendations is not only to generate financial savings but primarily to increase the influence 
of political decision makers on the processes of public administration and to enforce their 
political interests, by making even individual, ad hoc decisions. (Hajnal 2013; Pálné Kovács 
2011). The tool for this is a strong centralization of public administration. 
 Our greatest fear concerning the new public administration system outlined in the Magyary 
Programme is that there will be no clear split between political decision-makers and the public 
servants performing the administrative tasks in this strongly centralized system. Moreover it is to 
be feared that the execution of administrative tasks will be dominated by political power instead 
of professional arguments and expertise. This would run counter not only to the spirit of NPM, 
but also to the Weberian ideal. 
When analyzing the reasons for the reforms deep interconnections need to be considered, that 
cannot be subject of a detailed description in the present article. Consequently, only some 
hypotheses can be formulated to describe the underlying reasons for centralization. The 
following six hypotheses may be formulated. 
1. The governing party, FIDESZ has a centralized structure (Kertész 2012). Important decisions 
are all made by a small group, led by the party chairman / prime minister Viktor Orbán. A 
strongly centralized party in terms of structure and decision making procedures tends to 
establish a similarly centralized public administration system when forming a one-party 
government. 
                                                 
9
  The problem to which the programme would like to react is well known in the literature; nevertheless the 
system level solution suggested by the Magyary Programme is not in line with the NPM rather it gives a nice 
example of New Political Governance (Aucoin 2012:178). 
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2. According to Toubeau and Wagner (2013), the extent of decentralization or centralization 
also depends on the cultural and economic policy approach of a party. FIDESZ, in spite of 
being a central right conservative party, has a basically left wing, populist economic policy 
communication, whereas it primarily supports the upper-middle class with their actions (for 
example the introduction of single rate income tax, giving state support mostly to solvent 
people having foreign currency-based loans, etc.) Ideologically, however, they are clearly 
conservative, nationalist, sometimes using anti-EU rhetoric (Pogány 2013). According to the 
authors, parties in favour of implementing left wing economic policy normally prefer 
centralization because redistribution can take place with the help of the central state 
apparatus. Although FIDESZ is not a left wing party, it reallocates financial resources to 
privileged groups of the society, therefore, it is in their interest to strengthen the central 
administration. Toubeau and Wagner (2013) state that liberal parties are generally in favour 
of decentralization because it reinforces the diverse nature of the society whereas right wing 
parties prefer centralization in order to retain the feeling of national and territorial integrity. 
Toubeau – Wagner (2013) provide a good basis to understand the centralization efforts of 
FIDESZ. 
3. Another explanation of centralization – beyond the above-mentioned internal structure of the 
governing party – is that the intellectuals supporting FIDESZ do not consider the 
replacement of the elite groups that took place at the time of the transition sufficient and they 
still seem to be insulted by this. (G. Fodor – Kern, 2009: 65-66; Ripp 2010). Reasons for the 
lack of the replacement of the elite include the peaceful nature of the transition and the 
absence of a revolution. It is not accidental that according to FIDESZ communication, their 
electoral win was a “revolution”; it paved the way for the significant personal changes that 
took place in the public sector and to a certain degree in the business sector when they took 
power. The main characteristic of revolution is that the previous elite are destroyed and new 
elite emerge; this is taking place now, in course of the Hungarian public administration 
restructuring. 
4. The centralization of the Hungarian public administration is in line with the Leader 
Democracy model described by Körösényi (2005); it reflects a clearly defined idea of 
democracy. Based on Weber and Schumpeter, Körösényi (2005:360) states: “The Leader 
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Democracy is a minimalist concept of democracy that is skeptical of the feasibility of 
democracy in the sense of self-rule by the people”. The view of human nature and the 
conceptualization of democracy, which the Leader Democracy model is based on, have a 
strong impact on the actions of the Hungarian government. This elitist attitude is reflected in 
the centralization of the decision making, in the course of which every major decision is 
made by the Prime Minister or by persons or institutions close to him. A political leader such 
as Viktor Orbán is described by Max Weber as “charismatic” or by Burns as 
“transformative”; which is in compliance with the characteristics of a political leader 
described by Körösényi (2005:377), who describes him as being independent from ethical, 
scientific or societal limitations, only enforcing political aspects in his decisions. This 
interpretation of democracy was also close to Margaret Thatcher, Orbán’s political role 
model (Pakulski – Higley 2008). 
5. With the centralization efforts, the Orbán government intended to increase the power of the 
Hungarian state, because, in his opinion, in order to address market failures that had emerged 
after the transition, a strong central state is necessary. As Hutchcroft (2001: 28) states 
quoting Fesler (1968), the introduction of the system of the county level government offices 
and government commissioners are actually a step in this direction: “The single most 
effective strategy of centralizing rulers was prefectoralism, a system by which ’the national 
government divides the country into areas and places a prefect in charge of each’ (Fesler 
1968: 374). Fesler explains that the prefect ’represents the whole government, and all 
specialized field agents in the area are under his supervision’ (1968, 374)”. Fesler’s 
description is fully applicable for the Hungarian county government offices. 
6. Centralization is the government’s response to the economic crisis (’t Hart et al. 1993; Peters 
2011). According to ’t Hart et al. (1993:12) governments tend to respond to a crisis with 
strong centralization. As stated by the authors, it means the following: “First, it may refer to 
the concentration of power in the hands of a limited number of executives. Second, it may 
involve the concentration of decisional power with the central government vis-à-vis state, 
regional, or local agencies. Third, it may pertain to the tendency, under critical 
circumstances, to look for strong leadership and embrace one or another form of crisis 
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government” (’t Hart et al. 1993:12). As shown in Table 4, the Hungarian government 
applies all three forms of decision making centralization. 
Table 5 shows the linkage between the proposals of the Magyary Programme affecting processes 
and the NPM movement. 
 
Table 5. Relationship between the proposals and recommended measures for tasks and processes 
in the Magyary Programme and the NPM 
Reform proposals compatible with the NPM philosophy Reform proposals 
incompatible with the NPM 
philosophy 
"Direct involvement of citizens in the creation of customer-friendly and efficient 
processes.” (MPAJ 2011:8) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) customer orientation/quality 
management category 
  
"The proliferation of state organizations and the tangled mesh of unclear 
responsibilities are not only inefficient, but also one of the main causes of 
corruption." (MPAJ 2011:9) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) organizational restructuring 
category and Hood’s (1991) first and fourth doctrine 
  
Efficient and transparent management of tasks and the designation of the individual 
responsible for a particular task (MPAJ, 2011:29) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category 
and Hood’s (1991) first and fourth doctrine 
  
Separation of decision-making / purchasing and executive tasks associated with 
individual tasks (MPAJ 2011:31) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) organizational restructuring 
category and Hood’s (1991) fourth doctrine 
  
Uniform strategic planning in public administration (MPAJ 2011:34) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category 
and Hood’s (1991) first and fourth doctrine 
  
"The widespread integration of IT is undeniably one of the most important means of 
improving the efficiency of public administration. The broadening of e-government 
services and the improvement of their quality is an important part of the Magyary 
Programme” (MPAJ 2011:36) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category 
and Hood’s (1991) sixth doctrine 
"in this case too [IT 
integration], we must strive 
for the greatest possible 
centralization within the 
framework provided by the 
reliable operation of the 
systems, with an IT staff 
made up of public servants 
who have taken the oath; 
the purchase of any other 
personnel services can only 
be ancillary in this field” 
(MPAJ 2011:36) 
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Incompatible with Schedler 
and Proeller’s (2002) 
marketization / 
privatization category and 
Hood’s (1991) fifth 
doctrine 
"the simplification of unclear procedures and processes … is vital " (MPAJ 2011:36) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) organization restructuring category 
and Hood’s (1991) sixth doctrine 
  
"It is crucial that personal responsibility be continuously identifiable both in task 
setting and in the processes that must be drastically simplified for exactly this 
reason." (MPAJ 2011:37) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category 
and Hood’s (1991) second and fourth doctrine 
  
"Creating well-functioning processes and providing good quality services is 
insufficient for regaining the trust of the citizens and of social and economic 
organizations. If these actors are not involved in the planning of the services they are 
entitled to and in the decision-making affecting them, their confidence in public 
administration will not grow. Taking international best practice as a starting point, 
the goal of the Magyary Programme is that public administration should take the 
initiative in communicating with the people, and to encourage their active 
participation in the state’s activities." (MPAJ 2011:37) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) participation/partnership category 
This point cannot be linked to Hood’s (1991) doctrines 
  
Introduction of a Code of Ethics (MPAJ 2012:47) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) customer orientation/quality 
management category 
This point cannot be linked to Hood’s (1991) doctrines 
  
Source: MPAJ (2011) and MPAJ (2012) 
 
Table 5 reveals that in contrast to the systemic reforms outlined in the programme, the reform 
proposals for the organization of tasks and processes within an organization are in line with the 
proposals and attitudes embodied by NPM. The involvement of citizens in decision-making and 
maximizing customer satisfaction is defined as an important priority. One of the programme’s 
goals is to make the public administration system and the activity of public servant transparent 
and accountable. It adopts the international best practice (e.g., Code of Ethics) and various 
management techniques used in the private sector (e.g., strategic planning, greater IT 
integration). The emphasis on personal responsibility and the creation of a system of controls 
suggests that the authors of Magyary Programme have accepted the viewpoint of the public 
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choice theory, therefore making efforts to monitor public servants to ensure that instead of 
pursuing their own interests, their activities focus on public good, i.e. the interest of the citizens. 
 Table 6 shows the relationship between the proposals and recommended measures for 
procedures in the Magyary Programme and the NPM philosophy. 
 
Table 6. Relationship between the proposals and recommended measures for procedures in 
the Magyary Programme and the NPM philosophy 
Reform proposals compatible with the NPM philosophy Reform proposals 
incompatible with the 
NPM philosophy 
Reliable and predictable procedures (MPAJ 2011:38) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) organizational restructuring category 
and Hood’s (1991) sixth doctrine 
  
Standardized procedures, determination of service levels and standards (MPAJ 2011:38) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) organizational restructuring and 
management instruments categories and Hood’s (1991) sixth doctrine 
  
Continuous monitoring to ensure that the determined service level is kept (MPAJ 
2011:38) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category and 
Hood’s (1991) sixth and seventh doctrine 
  
Creation of an impact analysis system (MPAJ 2011:40; MPAJ 2012:54) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category and 
Hood’s (1991) seventh doctrine 
  
"The goal of the Magyary Programme is the elaboration - on the basis of a standardized 
methodology - of the annual work plan, action plan and reports of the ministries, the 
creation and maintenance of a central monitoring system of the sectoral and 
organizational indicators, and the survey and development of the ministries’ data 
collection systems and databases." (MPAJ 2011:40) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category and 
Hood’s (1991) third doctrine 
 
"The goal of the Magyar Programme is the creation of customer-oriented service 
operations taking account of the needs and interests of customers, the simplification of 
procedures, the reduction of civil administrative burdens and the development of high 
quality services accessible to all." (MPAJ 2011:41) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) customer orientation and quality 
management categories 
This point cannot be linked to Hood’s (1991) doctrines 
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"budget proposals in public administration should be prepared on a costs/revenues basis, 
instead of on earlier budget bases, in an ideal case using the activity-based costing” 
(MPAJ 2011:41) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) budgetary reforms category and Hood’s 
(1991) sixth doctrine 
  
Application of LEAN and BPR methods (MPAJ 2012:52) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category and 
Hood’s (1991) sixth doctrine 
 
System-level implementation of CAF (MPAJ 2012:53) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments and customer 
orientation/quality management categories and Hood’s (1991) third and sixth doctrines 
 
Development of one-stop shops – government windows (MPAJ 2012:55) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category 
This point cannot be linked to Hood’s (1991) doctrines 
 
Source: MPAJ (2011) and MPAJ (2012) 
 
 Table 6 shows strong linkage between the procedures outlined in the Magyary programme 
and the NPM: almost every organizational level recommendation and instrument of NPM 
appears in the programme. One of the goals set down in the programme is the use of budgeting 
procedures recommended by the NPM movement. For example, the introduction of performance 
budgeting (or accrual accounting) instead of cameralistic accounting would represent a 
significant advance in Hungary’s public administration. Proposals for the determination of 
service levels and standards by which the quality of public services can be measured can 
likewise be linked to the NPM movement. The time when the strategic and operative planning 
cycle of Hungarian public administration can be linked and unified using balanced scorecard 
does not seem too far away in the light of the proposals made in this section of the Magyary 
Programme. 
 Obviously, the question remains whether the plans outlined in the programme will be put 
into practice, which proposals will be accepted by decision-makers and which decisions will be 
executed by public servants. Our fears are based on Pollitt’s (2007:14) contention that there is 
considerably more talk about NPM reforms (discursive convergence) than actual political 
decisions made about their introduction (decisional convergence), while the number of NPM 
reforms implemented and accepted by public servants is even less (operational convergence). 
One of the potential dangers of the Magyary Programme is that the systemic reform proposals, 
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whose introduction seems straightforward from a change management and organizational 
sociological perspective, will be implemented or have in part already been put into practice, 
while the programme’s organizational level proposals – affecting processes, procedures and staff 
– will falter on the indifference of politicians and run up against the resistance of the public 
administration organizations. 
 Finally, Table 7 shows the linkage between the reform proposals concerning human 
resources and the NPM philosophy. 
 
Table 7. Relationship between the proposals and recommendations for human resource 
management in the Magyary Programme and the NPM 
Reform proposals compatible with the NPM philosophy Reform proposals 
incompatible with the 
NPM philosophy 
Creation of a so called “employer matrix”, i.e. a uniform framework for 
coordinating and organising work (MPAJ 2011:44) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category 
and Hood’s (1991) first doctrine 
  
Consideration of efficiency and performance during the creation of a career path 
model (MPAJ 2011:43) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category 
and Hood’s (1991) first and third doctrines 
  
"Professional expertise (‘he or she knows’) – appropriate selection, continuous 
training and the improvement of abilities and capabilities." (MPAJ 2011:44) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category 
and Hood’s (1991) first doctrine 
  
"Trust (‘let them do’) – necessary executive power with (material and professional) 
support from leaders, colleagues and customers." (MPAJ 2011:44) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) organizational restructuring 
category and Hood’s (1991) first doctrine 
  
Introduction of the HAY method for evaluation the scope of activities (MPAJ 
2012:65) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category 
and Hood’s (1991) first doctrine 
  
Introduction of a performance evaluation system (MPAJ 2012:67) 
 
Compatible with Schedler and Proeller’s (2002) management instruments category 
and Hood’s (1991) third doctrine 
  
Source: MPAJ (2011) and MPAJ (2012) 
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 The proposals for human resource management (HRM) set down in the Magyary 
Programme comply with the techniques current in the business world and are designed to 
enhance the efficiency of the public administration staff. Surveying the recommendations of the 
Magyary Programme, it is clear, that the authors of the programme have studied the HRM 
reforms introduced in Hungary and have clearly learnt from the mistakes made in the past. One 
case in point is the proposal for a performance assessment system, which will simplify the 
procedure and ensure more frequent feedback. However, it does not seem too promising that the 
performance assessment system is predominantly based on job descriptions because most of the 
tasks specified in these descriptions are obviously performed by public servants and thus a 
differentiation between the performances of individual public servants will run into difficulties.
10
 
However, the goal of the system is exactly to reward good performers and set them as examples, 
and to call attention to bad performers in order that both they and other public servants learn 
from their mistakes. An individual-based performance assessment system will only be effective 
if the salary of good performers is increased and if excellent performance serves as a model for 
the public administration staff. The Magyary Programme does not mention the objective 
performance indicators against which the performance of public servants is to be measured, 
perhaps because its authors did not wish to enter into these details, despite the fact that it is 
exactly these finer details that will determine whether the system will be feasible in the long run 
or whether its introduction will fail. It would be crucial to know whether the proposal refers to 
different performance indicators for different organizational levels (both horizontally and 
vertically), because the higher a position in the hierarchy, the more performance indicators 
should be linked to the organization’s goals, while the lower a position, the more these indicators 
should be linked to specific tasks. Although the Magyary Programme does not enter into details, 
the planned performance assessment system should promote (1) a better understanding and 
acceptance by public servants of organizational goals, (2) the long-term development of the 
organization’s staff, (3) the acceptance of the organization’s achievements by the staff, as well as 
of its consequences for their remuneration and their promotion, and finally (4) the better 
understanding of the organization’s achievements by the broader public. 
                                                 
10
  Version 12.0 of the Magyary Programme, however, claims that performance assessment will not be exclusively 
based on job descriptions, but on other criteria as well (MPAJ 2012: 66). 
 21 
 
 In addition to employing various NPM instruments, the Magyary Programme shows a 
commitment to downsizing the Hungarian public administration system by setting the goal of 
decreasing the number of public servants and filling up their ranks with young professionals. A 
smaller state is not synonymous with a weaker state: the consistent centralization on the systemic 
level, one of the obvious goals of the programme’s creators, is also apparent in HRM. Therefore 
the following new units have been created expressly for HRM: a Strategic Centre in the Ministry 
of Public Administration and Justice, a Methodological Centre based on the Office of Public 
Administration and Justice, a chamber-like organization called Self-Esteem Centre (in effect, a 
National Body of Government Servants) and, finally, a Training Centre as part of the National 
Public Service University (MPAJ 2012:59). Although the separation of various tasks is in line 
with the NPM philosophy, the strong centralization efforts appearing in the proposal and the 
corporatist attitude of the National Body of Government Servants is incompatible with NPM. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The objective of the study was to describe the main characteristics of the Hungarian public 
administration reform, to highlight the inconstancies of their elements and to draw attention the 
related risks. The reform recommendations set out in the basic document of the reform was 
compared with the ideal type NPM approach. Following a brief overview of the values and 
attitudes promoted by the NPM movement, as well as of NPM instruments, we offered a detailed 
analysis of the four so-called “intervention areas” in public administration discussed in the 
Magyary Programme. The macro level recommendations of the programme were analyzed in 
detail; it clearly set the objective of strengthening the central state administration, primarily 
through strong centralization. The level of centralization introduced by the Orbán government is 
significantly higher than the level of centralization implemented in the Western-European public 
administration systems as a response to the economic crisis. The possible reasons were also 
demonstrated; (1) the strongly centralized organizational structure and operation of the 
governmental party, (2) the cultural and economic policy attitude of FIDESZ, (3) the desire of 
the intellectuals supporting FIDESZ to replace the elite groups that did not take place at the time 
of the transition, (4) the prime minister’s and the his allies’ views on human nature and their 
approach of democracy, (5) the need to increase the power of the state and finally (6) the impact 
of the economic crises were described as possible reasons for centralization. In the case of 
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organizational level reforms not only the reform measures were described but also the context of 
the reforms. 
Based on the study we can state that the macro level reform recommendations reject the NPM 
philosophy, various NPM instruments are used on the organizational level and that the 
programme adopts the basic NPM attitudes on this level. Although this study did not seek to 
evaluate the Magyary Programme, it does offer an assessment of some of its proposals and 
recommendations, and it also points out a few potential sources of danger that might sabotage the 
programme’s goals. The greatest perils that the organizational reforms implemented by the 
current Hungarian government do not only contradict the principals of the NPM approach, but 
also, they over-centralize the Hungarian public administration system. This over-centralization is 
the main reason for the significant contradictions between the various areas of intervention of the 
Magyary Programme which might hinder the implementation of the micro level reform 
recommendations. 
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